Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Sierra Club Chemical Weapons Working Group,
and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation v.
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board :
Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mick G. Harrison; Robert Ukeiley; Counsel for Petitioners.
Laura Lockhart; Assistant Attorney General; Richard Ratherburn; Assistant Attorney General; Alan
D. Greenberg; Robert H. Foster, US Department of Justice; David W. tunderman; Craig D. Galli;
Parsons, Behle, and Latimer.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste & U.S. Army, No. 970313 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/882

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

50
DOCKET NO. 47P3).V<fr

S i e r r a Club,
Chemical Weapons Working Group, and
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation,
Petitioners and Appellants,

APPELLANTS f
REPLY BRIEF

VS

Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board

CASE No. 970313-CA
On Appeal of
Order of
Utah Solid
And Hazardous
Waste Control
Board

Agency and Appellee.

Laura Lockhart
Assistant Attorney General
160 East, 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873
801-366-0290, for the agency

Mick G. Harrison, Esq.
P.O. Box 467
Berea, Kentucky 40403
Robert Ukeiley, Esq.
1942 Broadway, Ste.
Boulder, CO 80302
Counsel for Petitioners

Richard Rathbun
Assistant Attorney General
160 East, 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873
801-366-0290, for Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board

Alan D. Greenberg, Robert H. Foster, U.S. Department of Justice
- 18th Street, Suite 945, North Tower
Denver, Colorado 80202
303-312-7324, for the Department of Army

c999

David W. Tunderman
Craig D. Galli
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
1

ARGUMENT
PRIORITY

#:14

FILED
FEB - 3 1998
COURT OF APPEALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT IN REPLY

4

A. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENERS ERR IN ASSERTING
THAT THE BOARD DID NOT DENY APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS
WHEN THE BOARD FAILED TO ALLOW PETITIONERS A REASONABLE
AMOUNT OF TIME TO PRESENT THEIR CASE AND CROSS EXAMINE
WITNESSES
4
B. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING
THAT THE APPELLANTS LACK STANDING — PETITIONERS'
STANDING SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED IN THIS CASE INVOLVING
UNIQUE ISSUES OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE,
IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

13

C. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING
THAT THE BOARD'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD DUE TO AN
ALLEGED FAILURE BY APPELLANT TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE

17

CONCLUSION

22

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Adkins v. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund,
J til

Ks JL J

Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R .R. Co., Inc.,
830 P. 2d 291, 293 (Utah App. ) cert. denied 836 P.
•
(Utah 1992)
*
»
•
Child£; v. Copper Valley Elec;. Assoc
860 P. 2d 1184, 1190 (Alaska 1993)

•

11

Clark v. Board of Directors of Kansas City School District,
915 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) .
.
.
.
9
In re Marriage of Goellner,
770 P.2d 1387 (Colo.App. 1989)

.

.

.

In re Application of Lamb,
539 N.W.2d 865, 866-67 (N.D. 1995)

8, 12, 12
10

Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Conun'n,
883 F.2d 117, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
6
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands,
869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)("National Parks")
14, 16, 16
Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm.,
817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991)

4

Shepard v. Shepard,
876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994)

4

Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental Quality,
857 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1993) .
.
.
.
.
.

14

Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
563 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1977)

6

Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991)

6

U.S. v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669, 687 - 688 (1973)

17

Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't,
616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980)

10

3

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A, THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE
BOARD DID NOT DENY APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS WHEN THE BOARD FAILED
TO ALLOW PETITIONERS A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO PRESENT THEIR
CASE AND CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES.
The United States Department of the Army, and their
contractor, EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. [hereinafter "Federal
Intervenor"] start out their section on the due process issue
with a perplexing argument on the proper standard of review.
Brief of Intervenors United States Department of the Army and
EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. ("Federal Br.") at 43, n. 14. The
Federal Intervenor admits that because this is a legal issue, the
Court reviews it under the correction of error standard.

The

Federal Intervenor goes on, however, to claim that the abuse of
discretion standard also applies.

Id.

The Federal Intervenor

does not even offer a theory on how two standards of review apply
to one issue.

To the extent that the Federal Intervenor claims

that the abuse of discretion standard applies to the due process
issue, it is wrong.
The due process issue, which is a question of law, is
reviewed under the correction-of-error standard that gives no
deference to the agency's decision.

Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah

State Tax Comm., 817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991).

The Federal

Intervenor provides the Court with an out of context quote from
4

Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994) to claim
that the due process issue should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

The quote provided by the Federal Intervenor is

about the standard of review for a relevancy issue.

Id. As an

evidence issue, relevancy is indeed reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

However, that is not applicable to the due process

issue.
In the next case cited by the Federal Intervenor, Berrett v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah
App.) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) the issue was the
propriety of the trial court's excluding a witness as a discovery
violation sanction.

While this is little help in determining the

standard of review for a due process violation, it is worthwhile
noting that this Court held that "[e]xcluding a witness from
testifying is, however, extreme in nature and . . . should be
employed only with caution and restraint."
omitted).

Id. (citations

This Court found that excluding a witness for a

discovery violation was indeed an abuse of discretion and
overturned the trial court's decision.

Id. at 297 - 298.

Turning to the federal case law cited by the Federal
Intervenor, Adkins v. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, 101
F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1996) involves a challenge to a procedural
rule promulgated by an agency and equally applicable to all
parties.

As in most rule making, the United States Court of
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deferred to the agency.
the Petitioners are not challenging a rule making.

However,

Rather they

are challenging how their particular trial-type hearing was
conducted.

The Federal Intervenor offers no case law to support

a deferential review of this sort of challenge.
In Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 883 F.2d 117, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1989) the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not
address the merits of the due process claim because that court
lacked jurisdiction.

The quote provided by the Federal

Intervenor is referring to deference given to an agency rule
making; in that case a rule making for a discovery rule.

Id. at

125.
Finally, Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commyn, 563 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1977) involved the question
of what process is due in an informal rulemaking.

Again, this is

not helpful in deciding the standard of review regarding the
current issue.
As a second threshold issue, the Federal Intervenor claims
that due process violations require a showing of substantial
prejudice unless there are egregious procedural constraints.
Federal Br. at 45, n. 15. None of the cases cited mention
anything about a rule requiring an egregious violation before a
showing of substantial prejudice is waived.
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Moreover, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney/ 818 P.2d 23
(Utah App* 1991) did not involve a particularly egregious
procedural constraint.

The plaintiff was denied the right to

cross examine a declarant of a statement even though the
plaintiff could cross examine the witness who testified as to the
declarant's statement.

Id. at 30. Nonetheless, this Court held:

This court recognized in D.B. that the denial of an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine a key witness
requires a new hearing, even if it appears that the
agency's decision may have had an adequate basis absent
tainted evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
Turning to the substance, the Federal Intervenor claims that
because the Petitioners did not challenge the limit on their time
until the trial had begun, they should lose their right to
complain.

The Federal Intervenor offers no support for this

proposition.
In re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387 (Colo.App. 1989)
addresses this exact issue.

In that case, the court held that

the fact that counsel had miscalculated the time needed to
present the case did not matter.

Id. at 1389.

Due process still

required that the parties be given a reasonable opportunity to
present their case and cross examine witnesses.
This is especially so in this case.

Id.

To begin with, the time

the Board used asking the Petitioner's witnesses questions was

7

charged against the Petitioners*

There is no way the Petitioners

could have accurately predicted how much time this would be.
Moreover, the nature of this action required the Petitioners
to rely on adverse and even hostile witnesses.
military base.

TOCDF is on a

It processes deadly chemical warfare materials.

Security is so strict that the use of lethal force has been
authorized to keep trespassers out.

In a situation such as this,

Petitioners must present their case through adverse or hostile
witnesses, making the task of predicting the time needed nearly
impossible.
This fact also refutes the Federal Intervener's next point.
The Federal Intervenor blame the Petitioners for the due process
violation, claiming that the Petitioners used their time poorly.
Federal Br. at 45 - 46.

The Federal Intervenor tries to support

this argument by citing to their counsel's oral argument on this
issue.

See Federal Br. at 46 citing IR-164 at 719 (oral argument

of Craig Galli, counsel for EG&G Defense Materials, Inc.).

Of

course, EG&G's counsel's advocacy via oral argument is not
evidence.
As further support, the Federal Intervenor states that
Petitioners offered live testimony of Dennis Downs while also
offering the deposition of Mr. Downs as an exhibit.

To begin

with, the Petitioners should not have to defend this practice.
In civil litigation and administrative proceedings involving

8

matters as grave as the permitting of a facility that burns
chemical weapons, the typical procedure is to both depose
witnesses and then present their live testimony to the fact
finder.

There is no reasonable explanation for why the

Petitioners should have been afforded less of an opportunity than
is typical in a case where the public health and safety is at
stake*
Furthermore, live testimony has a value to the fact finder
that a deposition does not.

This fact is the basis of a good

many of the standards of review for appellate courts. Mr. Downs
was the key decision maker in issuing the permits that are the
subject of this case.

Therefore, it was a reasonable, and

probably absolutely necessary, decision for the Petitioners to
present Mr. Down's live testimony.
Finally, there is the consideration that the Board is not
made up of judges, but rather of volunteers. Asking the Board to
read a two volume deposition, in addition to all of the other
exhibits they had, was a risky proposition.

It was one the

Petitioners could not afford to take.
The Federal Intervener's next argument is that because the
Board rescheduled the hearing twice, it was acceptable for the
Board not to allow the Petitioners to put on their case and cross
examine witnesses.

Federal Br. at 46.

9

The two situations are

unrelated.

Therefore, the Federal Intervener's argument does not

make sense.
The Federal Intervener's next try to bolster their argument
with selected cases from outside of Utah.
47.

Federal Br. at 46 -

An examination of the cases shows that they do not support

the Federal Intervener's position.
The Federal Intervenor cites to Clark v. Board of Directors
of Kansas City School District, 915 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).

In that case, a teacher was appealing his termination.

The court found that the teacher's strongest argument was that he
was denied due process because of the time limits imposed on him
by the administrative tribunal.

Id. at 772. However, the court

ruled against the teacher on this issue because the teacher
failed to raise this issue in the administrative process.

Id.

Like most appellate courts, the Missouri court would not decide
an issue that was raised for the first time on appeal.
Therefore, the only thing the Federal Intervener's should have
cited this case for is that the dicta in it supports the
Petitioners' claim.
Before looking at the next two cases, the Petitioners would
like to restate what the Federal Intervener's have already
pointed out.

That is that due process requires "such procedural

protections as the particular situation demands."

10

Federal Br. at

44 - 45 citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Depft, 616 P.2d 598,
602 (Utah 1980) .
Apparently having scoured the legal landscape, the best
support the Federal Intervenor's could find was In re Application
of Lamb, 539 N.W.2d 865, 866-67 (N.D. 1995).
47.

See Federal Br. at

In that case, the appellant failed the bar examination.

at 866.

Id.

Despite this fact, the appellant still wanted to be

admitted to practice law and was challenging the process given
him to challenge his denial of admission to the bar.

Id.

The

North Dakota court noted in a cursory fashion that the appellant
had been given adequate time to present his case.

Id. at 867.

This was a case involving the privilege, for admission to
the bar is not a right, of one person.

At stake was possibly

some degree of economic well being for this one person.

The

person's case was weak to begin with, as he was challenging a
test at least half of which was not administered by the
defendants but was administered on a nation wide basis.
In contrast, the present case involves the health and safety
as well as economic and psychological well being of a great many
people.

Even if the Board believed that dioxin, PCBs and the

other toxic chemicals released from TOCDF were "good" for people,
this case is a grave matter based on the fact that it involves
dissembling chemical warfare agent in explosively configured
weapons and then the incomplete burning of the chemical warfare
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agents GB (Sarin), VX and mustard "gas."

The process due in this

case cannot reasonably be compared to a bar examination failure's
challenge.
Similarly, Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Assoc, 860 P.2d
1184, 1190 (Alaska 1993) involved an individual's appeal from a
worker's compensation case.

To begin with, worker's compensation

cases are a high volume area, both for the agency and the courts.
In contrast, the present case is the only one the Board and this
Court will ever see challenging a facility's permit to begin
operations with live chemical warfare agent.

Therefore, it is

reasonable that more process is due in this unique and critically
important situation.
Similarly, the worker's compensation involved the economic
well being of an individual or at most, a small group of
individuals.

The present case, on the other hand, as stated,

involves the health, safety and economic well being of a great
many people.

Furthermore, the subject matter in this case is

almost assuredly more complex and definitely more voluminous than
in the worker's compensation case.

Therefore, what is a

reasonable process to decide the case must be appropriately
adjusted.
Petitioners do not mean to suggest, however, that plaintiffs
should be given short shrift in less complicated cases. Rather,
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Petitioners urge the Court to follow the well reasoned case of In
re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387 (Colo.App. 1989).
Goellner involved the relatively serious matter of a divorce
where there was a serious custody dispute.

Id. at 1388.

While

not a chemical weapons incineration, none the less the well being
of at least one child was a stake.

Based on representations from

counsel, the trial court allowed each side six hours to present
their case.

Id. at 1388.

The mother used five and a half hours

on cross examination which only left her a half hour to present
her case in chief.

Id.

mother any addition time.

The trial court refused to allow the
Id.

The appellate court held that this was a violation of the
mother's due process rights.

Id, at 1389.

This conclusion was

reached despite the fact that the appellate court also found that
the mother's trial counsel had miscalculated the time needed for
the case.

Id.

The appellate court held:

Nevertheless, while dockets in the domestic relations
division of the court may be crowded, and while the
trial court may have an obligation to move matters
before it as rapidly as possible, litigants are
nevertheless entitled to have sufficient time to make
an orderly presentation of their case.
Id. (citation omitted)
As in Goellner, the Petitioners wanted the opportunity to
fully cross examine all of the opposing parties' witnesses as
well as present their own witnesses.

13

At most this would have

taken a day or two more-

Considering how many people's health

and safety and economic interests are at stake in this case, the
Petitioners' request was certainly reasonable.

B. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE
APPELLANTS LACK STANDING — PETITIONERS1 STANDING SHOULD BE
RECOGNIZED IN THIS CASE INVOLVING UNIQUE ISSUES OF GREAT PUBLIC
IMPORTANCE, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Respondent Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board
("Board") argues that the Petitioners do not have standing.
Brief of Respondent Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board
("Board Br.") at 9 - 11. The Board is wrong.
The Board correctly points out that in Utah courts, a
plaintiff or petitioner can establish standing in one of three
ways.

Board Br. at 9.

See also National Parks and Conservation

Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah
1993)("National Parks").

One way to establish standing is if

"'the issues are unique and of such great public importance that
they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest.1
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799; see also Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 114850."

Board Br. at 10. This is clearly such a case.
The issues are unique.

Before this case, the Board has

never decided whether to issue a permit modification to begin
full scale live chemical warfare agent and chemical weapons
disposal operations to a facility.

In fact, in recent times no

agency has been faced with the issue of whether to issue such a
14

permit modification for any facility within the continental
United States.
The issues are also of great public importance.

TOCDF is

designed to burn over 10,000 tons of lethal nerve agents and
blister agents, as well as explosives and propellants.

The Board

admits that one of the issues is whether the risk of continued
storage of these chemical weapons is greater than the risk of
their incineration.

Board Br. at 10. By risk, the Board of

course is referring to the risk of countless people being killed
or injured by exposure to deadly chemical weapons.
is of obvious and great public importance.

This matter

Likewise, the issue

of which company is permitted to operate this dangerous facility
is also of great public importance.
However, what is not of importance for the standing analysis
is what side of the issue the Board came out on.

If that was of

consequence, then no Appellant would ever have standing because
all denials of permit challenges include a finding of no injury.
Had the Board found injury to the Petitioners or the public from
operation of the Tooele facility, Utah law would have required
denial of the permit and modifications in question.

Standing, of

course, cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to make it an
absolute bar to all appellants in all permit challenge cases.
Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental Quality, 857 P.2d
982 (Utah App. 1993) is easily distinguishable from the present
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case.

In that case, the plaintiff was challenging the failure to

conduct proper emergency planning as well as the completeness
determination by the agency regarding the permit application.
Id. at 986-987.

Because the plaintiff was not challenging the

actual beginning of operations with hazardous waste, but was
rather challenging a few of the preliminary procedural steps in
the permitting process, this Court found that the case was not of
great public importance.

Id. at 987.

In contrast, in the present case, the Petitioners are
challenging the beginning of operations with live chemical
warfare agent as well as which company will conduct these
operations.

See Brief of Interveners United States Department of

the Army and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. ("Army Brief") at 5
(adopted by Board Brief at 5). See also Petitioners' First and
Second Request for Agency Action, attached as Addendum C & D to
the Board Brief.

Thus, this is an appeal of permit modification

decisions of great importance.
National Parks establishes that Petitioners have standing
under the second standing test.

The second standing test is

whether the plaintiff can establish that there are important
public issues and no one else has a greater interest in the
outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be addressed
if no one else raises them.

National Parks, 869 P.2d at 913.
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In National Parks/ the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiff was founded to address the issue raised in the
that is the preservation of national parks.

Id,

case,

The legal

interest raised was the possible inimical environmental effects
on the park.

Id,

Based on these facts, the Supreme Court found that although
others may have an interest in the issues in the case, it was
unlikely that anyone would have a greater interest in the case
than the plaintiff.

Id,

Finally, the Supreme Court held that

the proper discharging of the State's fiduciary duties was an
important public issue.

Id, at 913-14.

The present case essentially tracks National Parks.
Petitioner, the Chemical Weapons Working Group ("CWWG") "is
dedicated to protecting public health and the environment in
communities around the sites proposed by the Army for chemical
weapons disposal."
at 2.

Petitioners1 First Request for Agency Action

See also Petitioners' Second Request for Agency Action at

2 (same).

CWWG's interest in the case is the environmental

damage TOCDF will cause to the community around it.

Id. at 2-3.

Based on these facts, it is unlikely that any other group
will have a greater interest in this case. Moreover, the burning
of weapons filled with deadly chemical warfare agent is an issue
of great importance to the public.
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Finally, even under the traditional test for standing, the
Petitioners have standing.

Under this test,

whether a plaintiff has the requisite personal stake to
challenge a governmental action turns on (1) the
existence of an adverse impact on the plaintiff's
rights, (2) a causal relationship between the
government action that is challenged and the adverse
impact on the plaintiff's rights, and (3) the
likelihood that the relief requested will redress the
injury claimed.
National Parks, 869 P.2d at 913 (citations omitted).
Petitioners have alleged that the pollution from the burning
of chemical weapons at TOCDF will adversely impact the
Petitioners rights to live, work, recreate and reside in the area
impacted by TOCDF's emissions.

Petitioner's First Request for

Agency Action at 2-3; Petitioner's Second Request for Agency
Action at 2-5.

Considerable evidence detailing the dangerous

nature of the toxic chemical emissions from the Tooele chemical
weapons incineration facility were presented to the Board and run
throughout the record.

The issuance of a permit modification to

begin burning chemical weapons, which is what is being
challenged, is directly related to the adverse impact alleged.
If the permit had not have been issued, there would be no impact.
Similarly, if the permit modification is revoked, the adverse
impact will be redressed-

Therefore, even under the traditional

three part standing analysis, the Petitioners have standing.
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It is true that others among the public beyond the
Petitioners may be harmed by the Board's permit decisions and the
subsequent actions of the Federal Intervenors in operating the
chemical weapons facility in question.
not diminish Petitioners' standing.

However, this fact does

As the United States Supreme

Court has noted:
... standing is not to be denied simply because many
people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the
cases on which we relied in Sierra Club demonstrated
the patent fact that persons across the Nation could be
adversely affected by major governmental actions... To
deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply
because many others are also injured, would mean that
the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that
conclusion.
U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 - 688 (1973).

C. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE
BOARD'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD DUE TO AN ALLEGED FAILURE BY
APPELLANT TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE.
The Board asserts that the Board's findings should be
accepted by this Court because of an alleged failure of
Petitioners to marshal the evidence.

Board Brief at 11-13.

However, according to the Board's own Brief, the caselaw
establishing the rule on marshalling evidence applies only to
challenges to findings of fact.

Id., at 11.

The Board fails to

note that Petitioners in this appeal are asserting several pure
errors of law to which the marshalling rule would not apply.
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A

prime example is the due process violation committed by the Board
in denying Petitioners a reasonable time to present their case,
discussed supra,
A second clear example is the Board's error of law in
granting a permit modification to allow EG&G to be operator of
the Tooele facility after the record reflects EG&G operated the
facility for many months without a permit in blatant violation of
Utah hazardous waste laws.

The issue of whether EG&G acted in

violation of law prior to the permit modification adding EG&G to
the permit is not a fact issue but rather is a question of the
legal significance of the facts that lie undisputed in the
record.

Likewise, once the legal determination is made that EG&G

acted in violation of State law in operating the Tooele hazardous
waste facility without a permit for many months, then a second
legal issue, not fact issue is raised.

That second legal issue

is whether Utah law requires the Board to deny EG&G the right to
operate the Tooele facility because of its past violations and
disrespect for Utah law.

The rule on the marshalling of evidence

regarding challenges to factual findings does not apply to these
type of issues and arguments raised by Petitioners.
The Board cites three examples of Petitioners arguments on
appeal to which the Board believes the marshalling rule applies.
Board Brief at 11-13.

The first is Petitioners' argument that

the record reflects an unacceptable health risk to infants
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resulting from toxic chemical emissions from the Tooele chemical
weapons incineration facility.

Petitioners do argue in this

appeal that the Board erred in granting the permit and
modifications of the permit for operation of the Tooele facility
in light of the cancer and non-cancer risk to infants, children
and adults.

See, e.g., Petitioners1 opening Brief at 36-37.

However, Petitioners' appeal regarding these health risks
does not involve challenging fact findings made by the Board
contrary to Petitioners assertions, but rather challenges the
legal errors made by the Board in misconstruing the legal
significance of undisputed facts in the record either
acknowledged by the Board or ignored in the Board's Order (i.e.
either the Board made fact findings in agreement with
Petitioners' fact assertions or made no fact findings on the
question that could be challenged).

For example, the Board does

not make fact findings contradicting Petitioners1 assertion that
the State Agency itself (the Department of Environmental Quality
or DEQ whose initial permit decision the Board has upheld)
calculated in its own health risk assessment for the Tooele
facility that the infant would receive a dose of dioxin 50 times
greater than the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry would consider safe.
The record reflects this fact as undisputed.
44.

See PX 4; PX

The calculations were done by the State's own consultants
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and the record reflects without dispute that the State made no
determination that this high dioxin dose to the infant was safe.
The State Agency offered no evidence to dispute the fact that the
State had performed the risk calculations showing the high dioxin
dose to the infant or to assert that the calculations were in
error.

The State simply asserted that it was not error to omit

the infant from consideration in the final risk assessment and in
their permit decision based on the asserted absence of an EPA
reference standard for dioxin non-cancer risk (the presence of
the ATSDR reference standard was not disputed).

The Board's

error in disregarding the legal significance of this undisputed
evidence is an error of law.
Likewise, the record reflects an admission by the Federal
intervener's own risk expert, Dr. Findley, that the dose of
dioxin he calculated for the infant would be greater than the
reference dose for dioxin indicated in the EPA's 1994 Dioxin
Health Assessment report.

IR 164 at 876-78.

These key facts

regarding danger to the infant from emission of ultra toxic
dioxin compounds from the Tooele incineration facility are not
disputed in the record and the Board Order makes no fact findings
on these facts.
The second example cited by the Board, the issue of omission
of open burning/open detonation from the risk assessment is
misconstrued by the Board to be a fact issue when again it is an
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issue of the legal significance of uncontested facts.

The Board

asserts that Petitioners should have marshalled opposing evidence
on this issue in the form of the State Agency's prohibition of
open burning and detonation while the Tooele facility is
incinerating chemical weapons.

However, this evidence is beside

the point raised by Petitioners.

Petitioners are concerned with

the omission of OB/OD not because of a risk that occurs only from
simultaneous occurrence of OB/OD and incineration but from the
cumulative risk resulting from the deposition of dioxin compounds
from both activities onto the same food sources where the poisons
persist for decades, making the sequence of operations
irrelevant.
The third example cited by the Board is the issue of
exclusion of dairy consumption from the risk assessment.

Again,

the Board misconstrues the nature of the issue raised on appeal.
The issue raised by Petitioners is the legal significance of the
State Agency and the Board approving operation of the Tooele
facility based upon an incomplete risk assessment that omitted
dairy consumption in the face of evidence available to the State
that such dairy consumption was occurring.

The record reflects

that the State omitted dairy consumption not based on the
conclusion that the information given the State was in error
regarding the existence of dairy farming in the area, but based
on the fact that the State did not know the name of the farmer
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(but new how to find out).

The fact that the State's later

survey did not locate the farmer is not relevant to the fact that
the State was told that such a farmer existed and did not
subpoena the source.
The Board's failure to address these facts and/or failure to
recognize the legal significance of these facts is what is at
issue in this appeal, not a challenge to fact findings made by
the Board.

Thus the marshalling of evidence rule is inapplicable

to these dispositive issues of law on which Petitioners believe
this appeal should be decided.
There are factual determinations made by the Board with
which Petitioners take issue, to be sure.

Had the Petitioners

done what the Board suggests in their Brief to marshall the
evidence on both sides of each of these issues and analyzed each,
Petitioners Opening Brief would have been several hundred pages
long.

Should this Court determine that one of these contested

facts is potentially dispositive and that Petitioners have failed
to marshall the evidence sufficiently in regard to such a fact
issue, Petitioners respectfully suggest that, considering the
public importance of this matter, Petitioners be allowed to file
a supplement to their Brief to provide the summary of evidence
required by this Court so that this matter may be determined on
its merits in the public interest.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners/Appellants
request that the Court reverse the Board's decision and order
that TOCDF's permit -- the specific permit for incineration of
chemical weapons, not the underlying Depot permit that involves
other waste management activities —

be terminated.

Petitioners

of course do not request an order prohibiting ultimate disposal
of the chemical weapons, which Petitioners are convinced can be
safely accomplished using alternative non-incineration methods
currently under review by the Army,

Should the Court not find

this appropriate, Petitioners request that the Court terminate
EG&G f s permit to operate TOCDF.

Finally, should the Court find

this inappropriate, Petitioners request that this matter be
remanded to the Board for a full hearing that comports with due
process requirements.
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